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In January 2020, a group of concerned experts convened in San Diego,
California to discuss solutions to the humanitarian and migrant health
crisis at the United States (U.S.)-Mexico border.1 My co-authors and I
were invited to contribute a white paper2 in anticipation of the meeting,
sharing our views about the solutions to forced migration from the
Northern Triangle region of Central America. Each of us had spent
decades weighing these questions as part of our work as environmental
justice, labor rights, or human rights lawyers. When we met in the
highlands of Guatemala in late 2019 to discuss our ideas, it quickly became
evident that we could not disconnect the conversation about solutions to
Central American forced migration from the long-term struggles for just
nations in the region. In our introduction, we explained that we felt
strongly that our frame for offering solutions had to embrace the
complexity of forced migration’s root causes, and at least try to take up
the daunting task of contextualizing these in the century long projects in
the region of building just nations post-colonization and post-conflict.3 At
the same time, we also acknowledged that we would do so, despite the
obvious: that “neither civil wars nor incredible ambitious peace processes
[had] been terribly successful [in helping] these nations transition to strong
and just democracies.”4
At the time we wrote the white paper, we harbored little hope that the
current political climate, both in the U.S. and in the region, would pay
much heed to our proposed solutions. This liberated us from
compromising our convictions and ideas to immediate political
pragmatism. Instead, we focused on longer-term solutions, which we
collectively believed could lead Hondurans, Guatemalans, and
Salvadorans to experience their own nations as viable options to remain
and lead dignified lives.5 Thus, we titled our paper Connecting Past and
Present: Central America’s Forced Migration as an Unfinished Project of
Building Just Nations Post-Conflict and Post-Colonization and provided
dozens of recommendations grounded in three principles: (1) insisting on
transnational or international solutions that both take seriously the moral
1

For information about the Border Humanitarian Health Initiative, see BORDER
HUMANITARIAN HEALTH INITIATIVE, https://www.borderhumanitarianhealth.org (last
visited Mar. 12, 2021).
2
See
White
Papers,
BORDER
HUMANITARIAN
HEALTH
INITIATIVE,
https://www.borderhumanitarianhealth.org/white-papers (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
3
Raquel E. Aldana, Mario René Mancilla & Luis Mogollón, Connecting Past and
Present: Central America’s Forced Migration as an Unfinished Project of Building Just
Nations Post-Colonization and Post-Conflict, UC DAVIS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER
(Forthcoming).
4
Id. at 2.
5
Id. at 18.
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responsibility of nations like the U.S. to provide real solutions to the region
and acknowledge the interdependence of issues and solutions to many of
the problems affecting the region; (2) capitalizing on the promise of local
governments or indigenous communities to take up important state
functions—distributional justice, protection of natural resources, and the
delivery of justice—as well as the role of organized civil society such as
cooperatives, churches, and other human rights groups to help promote
sustainable development and systems of public accountability (a broader
and deeper democracy); and (3) restructuring certain important solutions
to seemingly intractable challenges in the region—such as land
redistribution; threats to natural resources; or justice reforms—through the
lens of human rights and not solely through a private property or toughon-crime framework.6
A year later, the pandemic effects on the region, but also significant
changes in the political climate, at least in the U.S., lead me to refocus our
ideas in this essay toward a few more urgent and pragmatic solutions to
the persistent forced migration challenges in Central America’s Northern
Triangle that President Joe Biden could undertake in the first two years of
his administration. This is far from an abandonment of the broader and
more ambitious project we tried to envision in our white paper prepandemic. Rather, it is intended as a path forward to some of the
recommendations already contained in the document. The focus will be on
measures that the U.S. can undertake to help these nations avert the
enormous humanitarian crisis brought about by the pandemic including
starvation, a surge in violence, and a rise in extreme poverty—all of which
are fueling an increase in forced migration from the region.7 In this essay,
I focus specifically on two measures: (1) stabilizing the flow of
remittances from the U.S. to the region; and (2) increasing and
strategically reorienting aid to these nations to the most vulnerable
communities affected by the pandemic.
A focus on U.S.-based solutions to problems in the Northern Triangle
region requires at least some explanation. It is fair to push back on, or at
least seek a justification for, why this essay should focus on U.S.-based
solutions at a time when the U.S. is also facing a significant health,
economic, political and racial justice crisis.8 Foremost, the proposed
solutions in this essay do not replace the primary responsibility of these
nations to take up the challenging work of solving their problems. While
6

Id. at 9.
See infra Part I.
8
See Andrew Hammond et al., How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape
the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV. 154 (2020); Adam Serwer, The Next
Reconstruction,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/10/the-next-reconstruction/615475/.
7

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

81

insufficient, it is important to note that each of these nations has
undertaken important pandemic measures that are responsive to these
challenges.9 Nevertheless, the first principle guiding our proposed
solutions in the white paper—a focus on transnational or international
solutions—applies strongly to the proposed measures in this paper. Even
leaving aside the U.S. moral responsibility to Northern Triangle nations,10
it makes a great deal of sense that the well-being of Northern Triangle
nations is also good for the well-being of the U.S. There is always the oftprovided justification for helping Northern Triangle nations: that doing so
will help us avert even more forced migrants seeking to make the U.S.
their home.11 But there are also less obvious or less commonly proffered
justifications that promote U.S. interests. First, especially in the last forty
years, large pockets of nationals from these Northern Triangle nations
have made the U.S. their home, many themselves becoming U.S. citizens
while many more have U.S.-born children.12 Many have supplied the U.S.
with needed labor that has included their role as front line workers during
pandemic.13 We cannot simply dismiss our familial or communal
connections to these nations as foreign issues that do not affect the wellbeing of our own. Second, we live in an interdependent global economy
and these nations, while small, have been reliable trading partners doing
9

GOBIERNO DE GUATEMALA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD PÚBLICA Y ASISTENCIA SOCIAL,
Plan para la Prevención, Contención y Respuesta a Casos de Coronavirus (COVID-19) en
Guatemala [Plan for the prevention, containment and response to cases of Coronavirus in
Guatemala] (Mar. 2020), https://www.mspas.gob.gt/component/jdownloads/send/486plan/3074-coronavirus-covid-19.html; GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS,
SECRETARIA DE SALUD, Plan para la Contención y Respuesta a Casos de Coronavirus
(COVID-19) en Honduras [Plan for the containment and response to cases of Coronavirus
in Guatemala] (Feb. 2020), https://covid19honduras.org/?q=node/31; REPUBLICA DE EL
SALVADOR EN LA AM. CENT., DIARIO OFICIAL, DECRETO NO. 593.- Estado de Emergencia
Nacional de Pandemia por COVID-19 [National Pandemic State of Emergency for
COVID-19] (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.diariooficial.gob.sv/diarios/do-2020/03marzo/14-03-2020.pdf.
10
For a discussion of the U.S. moral responsibility to Northern Triangle nations, see
Christian Paz, The Biden Doctrine Begins With Latin America, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/joe-biden-foreignpolicy-latin-america/616841/; César Chelada, Why the U.S. Owes Central America, THE
GLOBALIST (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.theglobalist.com/united-states-trump-centralamerica-immigration/.
11
Jonas Gamso & Farhod Yuldashev, Targeted Foreign Aid and International
Migration: Is Development-Promotion an Effective Immigration Policy?, 62 INT’L STUD.
Q. 809, 809–10 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION:
FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 (2016) (“In our own Hemisphere, the budget requests money to
strengthen relationships between the United States and our regional neighbors, to address
the root causes of illegal migration, especially unaccompanied minors from Central
America, and to bolster Mexico’s enforcement capacity on its southern border”).
12
See infra Part II.A.1.
13
Id.
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business with the U.S.14 They are producers of many products and services
we consume, but also consumers of many products we send to their
homes.15 The economic well-being of these nations, thus, is also good for
our own economic well-being.
In Part I of this essay, I document what we know about COVID-19’s
effects on Northern Triangle nations and their likely impact on the push
factors that propel forced migration northward. In part II.A, I explore the
role of remittances in the region and discuss the measures that President
Biden can take up to ensure the sustainability of this important source of
economic stability to the region. In Part II.B, I discuss the most recent
history of U.S. foreign aid in the Northern Triangle, contrasting President
Obama’s policies with President Trump’s policies to inform and also
contextualize how President Biden might approach foreign aid in the
region in a time of pandemic and hopefully post-pandemic.

I. WE ARE NOT ALL IN THE SAME BOAT
Barely two months into the first pandemic shut down, the phrase
“[w]e are not all in the same boat, but we are in the same storm,” went
viral on social media, apparently adopted from a much longer poem that
highlighted how social inequities yielded vastly different experiences.16
Most certainly the resonance of this phrase had much to do with people’s
experiences that COVID-19’s effect was markedly different among
communities based on factors like race, class, and even geography.17 In

14

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CENTRAL
AMERICA’S NORTHERN TRIANGLE PROSPER UNDER CAFTA-DR (Feb. 2018),
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/us-agricultural-exports-central-america-s-northerntriangle-prosper-under-cafta-dr.
15
Id.
16
For a story of how this phrase went viral and the full length of the poem’s text, see
Pragadish Kirubakaran, ‘We Are Not All In The Same Boat . . . ‘ Covid Poster & Poem Win
Internet: Here’s Their Story, R.REPUBLICWORLD.COM (May 6, 2020),
https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/we-are-not-all-inthe-same-boat-story-behind-viral-post-and-poem.html.
17
Kaimipono David Wenger, 1200 Dollars and a Mule: COVID-19, the CARES Act,
and Reparations for Slavery, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC. (LAW MEETS WORLD) 204, 206-09
(2020); Christianna Silva, Why Latinx People Are Hospitalized From COVID-19 at 4 Times
the Rate of Whites, NPR (July 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/07/01/885923635/why-latinos-are-hospitalized-from-covid-19-four-timesthe-rate-of-white-american; Kim Parker et al., Economic Fallout from COVID-19
Continues to Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19-continuesto-hit-lower-income-americans-the-hardest/; Bradley Jones & Jocelyn Kiley, The
Changing Geography of COVID-19 in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2020),

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

83

the U.S., at least in my own social media bubble, most of the focus on
disparate suffering was on our domestic U.S. experience. But the phrase
bears much relevance as well to describe how COVID-19 is impacting
different nations.
A July 2020 United Nations (U.N.) report analyzing the pandemic’s
global economic impact highlighted both what it called a “synchronized
global crisis,” while at the same time emphasizing the disparate effects of
this economic precipice on different economies with a focus on Latin
American and Caribbean nations.18 The report noted, for instance,
projections for differential shrinkage in economic growth, interestingly
predicting a greater average percentage of 7% for developed nations in
contrast to 1.6% for emerging economies.19 Despite this, when decoupling
the financial dynamics from the drop in economic activities, the report
makes evident that the resulting effects of unemployment, poverty and
inequality, as well as the ability to transcend these, would vary
significantly to disadvantage those living in emerging economies with preexisting high levels of poverty, inequality, and poorly functioning
democracies.20 For the Latin America region as a whole, where most
nations remain emerging economies, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has predicted that the combination of a stalled informal economy, a
drop in tourism, capital flights, and climate disruptions will cause the
region’s largest-ever economic contraction.21 Even more worrisome is the
U.N. World Food Program’s prediction that “severe food insecurity” in
the region will quadruple, from 3.4 million to 13.7 million, during 2020.22
Central America has been disproportionately impacted by COVID-19
both in terms of the rate of infections and also its economic impact. In
August 2020, with a combined population of 49 million, Central America

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/12/08/the-changing-geography-of-covid-19in-the-u-s/.
18
UN ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC), SPECIAL REPORT,
COVID-19,
NO.
5,
at
1–4
(July
15,
2020),
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45784/4/S2000470_en.pdf
[hereinafter ECLAC REPORT].
19
Id. at 2.
20
Id. at 5-12.
21
Kristalina Georgieva, A Joint Response for Latin America and the Caribbean to
Counter the COVID-19 Crisis, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 24, 2020),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/24/sp062420-a-joint-response-for-latinamerica-and-the-caribbean-to-counter-the-covid-19-crisis.
22
Austin Horn, 14 Million People in Latin America, Caribbean at Risk of Hunger, U.N.
Report Says, NPR (May 28, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/05/28/864076929/14-million-people-in-latinamerica-caribbean-at-risk-ofhunger-u-n-report-says.
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reported an average of 8,202 coronavirus cases per million residents as
compared to a global average of 3,500.23
In terms of economic impact for the Central American region, the July
2020 U.N. Report makes a few important observations. First, it notes that
unlike other crises that largely affected trade in goods, this pandemic’s
disparate effect on services has hit the region hard, given its effect on
tourism and the related service industries, which are a major driver of
economic activity in the region.24 It further highlights that the expected
substantial drops in commodity prices, including for products such as
coffee and sugar, which are large exports for Central America, will
negatively affect the region in terms of net exports.25 Additionally, the
report highlights the large drops in remittances as the pandemic’s
economic woes linger in the U.S., which will especially impact economies
like those of El Salvador and Honduras whose remittances represent about
20% of the GDP.26
Overall, based on estimated effects of an ongoing pandemic, the report
predicts that El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala will experience drops
of 9, 8.6 and 4.1 percent in GDP in 2020 respectively.27 All of this, the
report concludes, will set back most of the Latin American region a decade
in terms of its economic gains, and the impacts of this will be felt in
increased unemployment rates and the further deterioration of poverty and
extreme poverty. For example, in El Salvador, extreme poverty is
projected to increase from 7.4 to 11.9 percent from 2019 to 2020, whereas
poverty will increase from 33.7 to 40.2 percent of the population. In
Guatemala, extreme poverty will go up from 19.8 to 22.7 percent while
poverty will increase from 48.6 to 51.6 percent of the population. In
Honduras, where over half of the population already lives in poverty, the
percentage will increase from 54.8 to 59 percent, whereas extreme poverty
will rise from 18.7 to 22.2 percent.28 At the same time, inequality will grow
in the region and will be worse for El Salvador, the country in the Northern
Triangle that has made the most gains in addressing inequality in recent

23

María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila et al., Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Central
America Economic Reactivation in a Covid-19 World: Finding Sustainable Opportunities
in
Uncertain
Times,
ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
2
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Central-AmericaEconomic-Reactivation-in-a-COVID-19-World-Finding-Sustainable-Opportunities-inUncertain-Times-1.pdf.
24
ECLAC REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that tourism in Central America was
down by 35% from the same time the previous year).
25
Id. at 4.
26
Id. at 5.
27
Id. at 9.
28
Id. at 11.
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years.29 According to the report, El Salvador’s inequality index will go up
by as high as 5.9 percentage points whereas Honduras will go up as high
as 2.9 percentage points and Guatemala as high as 1.9 percentage points.30
The human impact of all the above economic projections will be
nothing short of terrible, especially for populations that were already
vulnerable pre-pandemic. An example of the particular vulnerability of
Northern Triangle nations is highlighted in a U.N. report which points to
the countries’ lack of sanitary infrastructure in most rural areas in addition
to a dearth of access to hospitals and basic healthcare.31 A July 2020
Oxfam report of the region (and Venezuela) was titled in Spanish “Aqui
lo que hay es hambre: Hambre y Pandemia en Centroamérica y
Venezuela” (What you Will Find Here is Hunger: Hunger and Pandemic
in Central America and Venezuela).32 According to this report, prepandemic, already about 4.5 million persons in what is known as the dry
corridor in Central America were food insecure and these numbers are just
getting worse as levels of extreme poverty rise in the region.33 This region
experienced as much as 20% drops to already meager levels of income due
to pandemic restrictions and drops in remittances, at the same time that the
cost of basic staples, such as beans and corn, began to rise.34 A survey of
forty-one communities in four countries in the dry corridor region found
that 57% of reported experiencing food insecurity and moderate to severe
malnutrition.35 In households with women as the head, this figure rose to
63%.36
29

The World Bank in El Salvador: Overview, THE WORLD BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/elsalvador/overview (last updated Oct. 9, 2020)
(“El Salvador also [recently] became a more equal country in recent years, with the secondhighest level of equality in Latin America and the Caribbean, after Uruguay, on par with
the world average. Inequality–measured by the Gini coefficient–declined from 0.51 in 2001
to 0.38 in 2018.”).
30
ECLAC REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
31
UN OFF. FOR COORDINATION HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (UNOCHA), Panorama de las
Necesidades Humanitarias: El Salvador, Guatemala, y Honduras (Addendum: Impacto De
La COVID-19) 6 [Overview of Humanitarian Needs: El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras
(Addendum:
Impact
of
COVID-19)]
(May
2020),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20200616_HNO_CENTROAMERI
CA%20ADDENDUM.pdf.
32
OXFAM INTERNACIONAL, ‘Aqui lo que hay es hambre’: Hambre y Pandemia en
Centroamérica y Venezuela [‘Here there is hunger’: Hunger and Pandemic in Central
America]
(July
2020),
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Aqu%C3%AD%20lo%20que%20h
ay%20es%20hambre%20Oxfam%20Media%20Brief.pdf.
33
Id. at 8. The dry corridor runs parallel to the Pacific Coast through parts of Mexico,
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Id.
34
Id. at 9.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 10.
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Another extremely worrying projection is the effect of COVID-19 on
insecurity in the region. A November 2020 study titled Virus-Proof
Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in Mexico and the Northern Triangle
found that while the pandemic initially slowed down organized crime in
the region, criminal groups, such as gangs and narcotraffickers, adapted
quickly to tighten and even expand their control over people and
territories.37 After the outbreak, street gangs across the Northern Triangle
advertised themselves as champions of communities under lockdown,
handing out food baskets and forgiving protection payments.38 Due to
COVID-19 movement restrictions, violence fell briefly in Honduras and
Guatemala, but it is now back to or above pre-pandemic levels, while
extortion rackets in both countries appear set to intensify.39 El Salvador is
an outlier in that murder rates have stayed close to historical lows for
reasons that remain disputed.40 Among the most disturbing trends is the
return to extortions as a primary means of generating revenue and the very
likely reality of many more recruits who will not have a choice but to join
gangs as they expand or solidify control over territories profoundly
impacted by the pandemic.41
The governments in the Northern Triangle have taken important steps
to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis generated by the pandemic.42 El
Salvador, for example, was one of the fastest countries in Central America
to adopt strong containment measures against the outbreak and also to
limit its impact on households and businesses.43 Some of the measures
included cash transfer to approximately 60% of all households, food
distribution for low-income households, and a grace period for loan
repayments, among others.44 These efforts have not been nearly enough,
have not reached those most in need, or have been plagued by delays, nontransparency or corruption.45 The Oxfam report describes, however, how
El Salvador’s measure to give $300 to the most vulnerable resulted in
37

INT’L CRISIS GRP., Virus-Proof Violence: Crime and Covid-19 in Mexico and the
Northern Triangle, LATIN AMERICAN REPORT NO. 83, at i (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. (“The government says its security plan has kept violent gangs at bay, while Crisis
Group has suggested that gang and government leaders may have struck an informal
agreement to scale back violence. But, if such a pact exists, neither side has acknowledged
it in public”)
41
Id. at 6, 14.
42
Brizuela de Ávila et al., supra note 23, at 2. In fact, the only country in Central
America that did not adopt COVID-related measures was Nicaragua. Id.
43
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 29.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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month long delays due to distributional challenges. In Honduras, the
approval of a substantial pandemic relief package has been criticized for
corruption and lack of transparency in the implementation.46
Given the above, COVID-19 will also affect migration trends and the
needs of migrants. This already includes numerous cases of migrants
stranded due to movement restrictions as well as effects on unemployment
rates and income generation in both countries of origin and residence.47
Early reports suggested that the pandemic significantly slowed down new
waves of migration to the U.S.48 However, these trends are likely to be
temporary. In June 2020, the U.N. International Organization for
Migration conducted a survey, inter alia, on people who had the intention
of migrating from Central America prior to the pandemic.49 Survey results
reveal that the pandemic only delayed people’s intention to migrate, but
few abandoned their plan to do so in the future.50 Unfortunately, the
devastation from recent hurricanes in the region51 on top of the pandemic
is already spurring new waves of desperate migration. According to data
from Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the number of people
apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border has already climbed in six
straight months, to more than 69,000 in October from 17,000 in April
2020.52 Sadly but predictably, at the beginning of 2021, a new precarious
caravan of approximately 2,000 mostly Honduran nationals began their
journey north and are already facing insurmountable challenges, including
batons and tear gas from police forces in Guatemala.53

46

OXFAM INTERNACIONAL, supra note 32, at 10.
UN INT’L OFF. FOR MIGRATION (IOM), Effects of COVID-19 on Migrants 6 (June
2020),
https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/surveyeffects_of_covid19_june_2020_final.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=9720 [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
48
See, e.g., José de Córdoba & Michelle Hackman, Coronavirus Pandemic Slows Illegal
ST.
J.
(April
19,
2020),
Migration
to
U.S.,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-pandemic-slows-illegal-migration-to-u-s11586481423.
49
IOM REPORT, supra note 47, at 6.
50
The pandemic affected migration plans for 57% of those surveyed. Among the people
with the intention of migrating, the highest percentage of people postponed travel due to
the pandemic (47%). Additionally, only 10% of people changed their minds due to the
pandemic declaration and no longer wished to migrate. Id. at 15.
51
See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
52
Michael D. McDonald & Eric Martin, Migrant Caravans Head to U.S. Border in
(Dec.
9,
2020),
Early
Test
for
Biden,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-09/migrant-caravans-head-to-u-sborder-giving-biden-an-early-test.
53
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INTERNALIZING SOLUTIONS TO FORCED MIGRATION

A year ago, in the section of our white paper focused on the U.S.-based
policy changes needed to address the root causes of the Northern
Triangle’s forced migration, our recommendations ranged from
addressing climate change to drug liberalization and immigration and
trade reforms.54 In this essay, I focus instead on the most pressing and
viable reforms under a Biden administration that can have the most
immediate impact on the most urgent humanitarian needs in the region.
Section A specifically focuses on immigration reforms that a Biden
administration can undertake without the need for legislation that both
seek to end practices that are aggravating the health and humanitarian
crisis and ones that promise to bring greater stability to the Northern
Triangle region. Days into his confirmation as President, Joe Biden
pledged to introduce comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) legislation
within days of taking office that would create a path to legalization to the
estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.55 With
Democrats in control of both chambers of Congress, CIR legislation is
now a viable political option. Still, this possibility whose outcome is not
guaranteed and will take time should not deter the Biden administration
from adopting important measures right away on its own that will not only
provide urgent need to the Northern Triangle region but can also help to
pave the way for CIR. For context, prior to the policy recommendations,
this section provides a brief profile of migrants and recent migration
patterns from the Northern Triangle region to the U.S. and an explanation
of the stabilizing role of remittances sent home by these migrants to the
region.
Section B then turns to recommendations to increase and shift
priorities to the U.S. foreign aid that a Biden administration will likely
send to the region. For context, this section first explains the priorities for
foreign aid adopted in the second term of President Obama’s
administration and the changes to these during the Trump Presidency.

54

Aldana et al., supra note 3, at 8-15.
FACT SHEET: President Biden Outlines Steps to Reform Our Immigration System by
Keeping Families Together, Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration, and
Streamlining the Legal Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/02/fact-sheetpresident-biden-outlines-steps-to-reform-our-immigration-system-by-keeping-familiestogether-addressing-the-root-causes-of-irregular-migration-and-streamlining-the-legalimmigration-syst; Biden Will Introduce Immigration Bill Immediately, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
8, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2021-01-08/biden-will-introduceimmigration-bill-immediately-video.
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A. Why and How U.S. Immigration Reforms Can Aid Recovery in
the Northern Triangle
1. A Profile of Northern Triangle Migrants and Immigrants in
the United States and at the U.S.-Mexico Border
The Migration Policy Institute’s most recent profile of Central
American immigrants estimates there are a total of 3.5 million living in the
U.S., most from the Northern Triangle region.56 This is not a large share
of the U.S. immigration population, comprising only around 8% of the
44.5 million immigrants in 2017.57 However, for these Northern Triangle
nations, the number of its nationals living abroad, nearly 90% in the U.S.,
as an overall share of their respective populations, the numbers are
comparatively high. This is especially true for El Salvador which in 2019
had nearly a quarter of its nationals living abroad, followed by Honduras
at over 8% and Guatemala at nearly 7%.58
One notable characteristic of this population is that, comparatively
speaking, many still remain in the U.S. in uncertain immigration status
despite their length of stay and their deep ties to this country. 44% of
Salvadorans,59 33% of Guatemalans,60 and 29% of Hondurans,61 for
example, have been in the U.S. for over twenty years. Overall, U.S.
immigrants are in the country legally (77%) with nearly half (45%) being
naturalized citizens.62 In contrast, only 33% of Salvadorans, 28% of
Guatemalans and 24% of Hondurans in the U.S. are naturalized citizens63
while they represent a growing share of U.S. unauthorized immigrants
56
Allison O’Connor et al., Central American Immigrants in the United States,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/centralamerican-immigrants-united-states-2017.
57
Id.
58
See
Emigrantes
Totales
[Immigrant
Totals],
EXPANSIÓN,
https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/migracion/emigracion (last visited Mar. 11,
2021). To bring some perspective, Mexico, which is still the largest sender of immigration
to the United States (24%), has a share of 9.25% of its nationals living abroad. See id. See
also Emma Israel & Jeanne Batalova, Mexican Immigrants in the United States,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexicanimmigrants-united-states-2019.
59
Luis Noe-Bustamante et al., Facts on Hispanics of Salvadoran Origin in the United
States,
2017,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/u-s-hispanics-facts-on-salvadoranorigin-latinos/.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Abby Budiman, Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 20,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-simmigrants/.
63
O’Connor et al., supra note 56.
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(around 1.9 million in 2017), most of them from the Northern Triangle
region.64 They also remain top beneficiaries of programs like Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals
(DACA).65
Another notable characteristic is that Central Americans participate at
higher rates in the labor force than both the overall foreign and U.S. born
populations.66 About 72% of Central American immigrants participate in
the civilian labor force, compared to 66% of the total immigrant
population and 62% of native-born individuals. Salvadorans and
Guatemalans in particular had the highest labor force participation rates at
74% each.67 Moreover, more than a third of all Salvadorans, Guatemalans
and Hondurans work in service occupations68 and comprise a growing
proportion of U.S. farmworkers.69 Many, alongside other immigrants,
became essential workers during the pandemic. A recent study on the role
of immigrants as essential workers during the COVID-19 pandemic found
that generally immigrants are over-represented in “essential industries”
(defined as including agriculture, food, distribution and health) while
Mexican and Central Americans in particular are disproportionately so.70
The largest over-representation is in agriculture: unauthorized immigrants
comprise 22% of agriculture workers in the U.S. and 43% in California.
Most of the manually intensive, risky jobs in agriculture are performed by
Mexican and Central American immigrants, who are often undocumented
and who have continued to keep the U.S. agriculture industry operating
even in these months of the COVID-19 pandemic.71 Finally, Central
Americans tend to have lower incomes than overall foreign ($46,000) and
64

Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RSCH.
CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-aboutillegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.
65
O’Connor et al., supra note 56.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Farm Labor, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farmeconomy/farm-labor (last updated Apr. 22, 2020).
70
Giovanni Peri & Justin C. Wiltshire, The Role of Immigrants as Essential Workers
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, UC DAVIS GLOB. MIGRATION CTR.,
https://globalmigration.ucdavis.edu/role-immigrants-essential-workers-during-covid-19pandemic (last visited Mar. 12, 2020). See also, e.g., Jose A. Del Real, In an Immigrant
Community Battling Coronavirus, ‘Essential, Means ‘Vulnerable,’ WASH. POST (May 9,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-an-immigrant-community-battlingcoronavirus-essential-means-vulnerable/2020/05/08/c25cdb4e-8e1e-11ea-a9c073b93422d691_story.html; Donald Kerwin & Robert Warren, US Foreign-Born Workers
in the Global Pandemic: Essential and Marginalized, 8 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC.
1, 1 (2020).
71
Peri & Wiltshire, supra note 70.

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

91

U.S. born individuals ($60,800), with Guatemalans and Hondurans
earning the lowest incomes at only $43,000 and $40,000 respectively
according to 2017 data.72
A third notable characteristic is the recent increase in the number of
Central Americans, especially from the Northern Triangle region, who are
seeking asylum in the U.S. or other types of humanitarian relief, such as
those available to unaccompanied minors. For example, from the Northern
Triangle region, more individuals affirmatively sought asylum in 20142016 than in the preceding seventeen years combined.73 The number of
affirmative asylum applications by migrants from Central America’s
Northern Triangle countries rose from 3,523 in 2012 to 31,066 in 2017, an
almost 800% increase.74 Unaccompanied children filed the majority of the
affirmative asylum applications from the Northern Triangle countries,
making up 66% of the applications in 2015 and 56% in both 2016 and
2017.75 By 2018, the number of affirmative asylum applications from the
Northern Triangle saw a sharp decrease of 19%, although unaccompanied
minors still made up 60% of these applications.76 By 2019, the last year
for which published data is available, Salvadoran affirmative applications
showed the greatest decrease by 35% from the previous year, while
Guatemala and Honduras showed drops of 9% and 8.7% respectively.77
Again, from these nations, the majority (52%) of filings for asylum came
from unaccompanied minors.78
The decrease in affirmative asylum applications in recent years does
not necessarily mean that fewer Central Americans have been making the
trek northward hoping to seek asylum or other protections in the U.S. In
fact, U.S. CBP data shows that Southwest border apprehensions increased,
substantially so, during the same period that affirmative asylum

72

O’Connor et al., supra note 56.
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SEC.
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SEC.
at
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(Mar.
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Id.
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SEC.
at
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(Oct.
2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2018/refugees_asylees_2018.pdf.
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at
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(Sept.
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applications decreased.79 Instead, a more likely explanation for the drop in
asylum applications from Northern Triangle nationals has to do with the
significant changes in asylum policies and practices adopted during the
Trump administration that barred many from applying.80 Moreover, since
President Trump enacted the Migrant Protection Protocols (also known as
“Remain in Mexico”) Program, which forces asylum seekers to wait out
their time to apply for asylum in Mexico, more than 66,000 applicants,
many of whom remain in makeshift encampments in various parts of
Mexico, were already part of the program by September 2020.81

2. The Important of Remittances to the Northern Triangle and
Its Implications on U.S. Immigration Policy
Remittances or money that immigrants send back home have played a
very important role in alleviating poverty, improving nutritional outcomes,
reducing child labor, and increasing investments in education in middle to
lower income countries across the globe.82 This is especially true in
Northern Triangle nations where remittances represent a substantial share
of these nations’ GDP. In 2019, remittances constituted greater than 20%
of the GDP in El Salvador and Honduras, and greater than 10% of its GDP
in Guatemala.83 This represents billions of dollars, most of which flow
79

In fiscal year (FY) 2017, for example, Southwest border apprehensions were 415,517.
The first year that asylum applications went down, 2018, border apprehensions climbed to
521,090 and then substantially to 977,090 in 2019. It was only in 2020 that this number
began to drop but was still higher than in 2017 at 458,088. Southwest Land Border
Encounters,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION,
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See Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations;
Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018); Asylum Eligibility
and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019); Procedures for Asylum
and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg.
36,264 (June 15, 2020); Security Bars and Processing, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,201 (July 9, 2020);
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,692 (Sept. 23, 2020);
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2020).
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(Apr.
22,
2020),
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83
Massimo Meccheri, Migración y empleo frente al covid-19: insumos y propuestas
para un plan de recuperación, reconstrucción social y resiliencia de la región
centroamericana, EUROSOCIAL [Migration and employment in the face of covid-19:
inputs and proposals for recovery, social reconstruction and resilience plan for the Central
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directly into the hands of family members. In 2016, for example, between
80–85% of the 1.2 million Salvadorans living in the U.S. sent money home
to the tune of $4.6 billion.84 Between 80–90% of these monies are used to
pay for basic necessities, such as housing, food, and health care.85 Sadly,
this means that a reduction in remittances will impact directly the
livelihoods of families who stop receiving them. At a time of profound
crisis in the region, the consequences of this will be dire.
For Latin American nations, 75% of all remittances originate from the
U.S and around 3 million migrants are expected to lose their jobs as a result
of the pandemic.86 The World Bank had calculated that due to the effects
of the pandemic to receiving nations of migration, remittances to the Latin
American region as a whole will decrease by 19.3% in 2020, the largest
decline in recent history.87 Especially, in the first sixth months of the
pandemic, drops in remittances were quite sharp, and especially so for El
Salvador, which experienced an 8% change from the previous year.88 The
good news is that these numbers rebounded and did not yield the predicted
losses by the end of 2020. Latin America overall had a 1% increase in
remittances in 2020, while the amount sent to Africa and Asia dropped by
9% and 8% respectively.89 For each of the Northern Triangle nations,
surprisingly, remittances in 2020 even outperformed those sent in 2019 by
even higher percentages. Guatemala received remittances of $11.34
billion, an amount that is 8% higher than the $10.58 billion recorded in
2019.90 For El Salvador, remittances grew from 2019 by 0.08% to 5.27 for

American region] (Aug. 6, 2020), https://eurosocial.eu/bitacora/migracion-y-empleofrente-al-covid-19-insumos-y-propuestas-para-un-plan-de-recuperacion-reconstruccionsocial-y-resiliencia-de-la-region-centroamericana.
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BORGEN PROJECT (Feb. 12, 2018), https://borgenproject.org/remittances-to-el-salvador/.
85
See Meccheri, supra note 83.
86
Mariellen Malloy Jewers & Manuel Orozco, Migrants, Remittances, and COVID-19:
Remittance Behavior and Economic and Health Vulnerabilities, THE DIALOGUE 4 (Aug.
2020),
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a total of 5.27 million dollars.91 For Honduras, the growth from 2019 was
2.8% for a total of $5.65 billion dollars.92
According to experts, the resilience of U.S. migrants, their devotion to
families left behind, and their continued employment during the pandemic
in the front lines in jobs that are considered essential (at grave risks to
themselves and their families) has meant that remittances have been
ongoing, including to the Central American region.93 However, the Trump
administration’s U.S. immigration policies and its terrible response to the
pandemic, which has left the entire U.S. population vulnerable, threatens
the ability of Northern Triangle migrants to sustain the enormous
contributions they make through their monthly sacrifices of sending part
of what they earn to family who remain. For this reason, the sustainability
and growth of remittances to the Northern Triangle will both depend on
the U.S.’s overall economic recovery from COVID-19—which will in turn
depend on our ability to contain the virus’ spread through mass
immunization and other measures—and on reversing several immigration
policies and practices that have affected migrants from the region
especially during but also prior to the Trump administration.
The rest of this essay provides recommendations specifically oriented
to safeguarding and protecting the well-being and security of migrants
from the Northern Triangle region—not only those who are already here
but also those who have a right to immigrate based on existing
immigration laws, including those that recognize family unification and
our obligations to protect asylum-seekers.

3. The Immigration Laws, Policies and Practices Affecting
Northern Triangle Nations that Must Change Immediately
a. Immigration Detention and Deportation Practices that
Are Spreading COVID-19 in the Region Must Stop
Immediately Until the Virus is Controlled
President Biden has pledged to take up two important changes to
interior immigration enforcement that, if implemented right, could stop the
spread of COVID-19 infections to the region based on ongoing detention
91

Tomás Guevara, Aumento de remesas dependerá de situación de empleo en los
EE.UU., ELSALVADOR.COM [Increase in remittances will depend on employment situation
in the U.S.] (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.elsalvador.com/eldiariodehoy/aumento-remesasdependera-situacion-empleo-estados-unidos/794559/2021.
92
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Honduras, TIEMPO DIGITAL [Despite the COVID-19 Crisis, Remittances Increased in
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and deportations of nationals to those countries: (1) end prolonged
detention and reinvest in a case management program; and (2) restore
sensible immigration priorities.94
In July 2020, the New York Times, in collaboration with the Marshall
Project, released an investigative report documenting how immigration
detention and deportation practices were becoming spreaders of the
coronavirus.95 Then, the report highlighted how thousands of immigration
detainees, many of whom were being transferred from one detention center
to another, were sick with the virus.96 The report also documented
deportations, often in secret night flights, of sick detainees back to their
countries, including nationals from the Northern Triangle.97
Northern Triangle nations have tried to institute strict quarantine
measures for those returned; however, those deported are being kept in
detention centers that are not following health containment guidelines and
are contributing to the virus’s spread.98 Upon release, deportees are
significantly stigmatized as carriers of the virus and are generally excluded
from the already taxed health services available.99
The pandemic did substantially slow down the number of deportations
generally and thus also deportations of Northern Triangle nationals.
According to data from the International Organization on Migration, in
2019, the U.S. and Mexico together deported 251,778 Central American
nationals but fewer than 50,000 during the first quarter in 2020.100 But this
is still insufficient. Especially until COVID-19 is contained, all
immigration detention practices in the U.S. that are unsafe and
unnecessary must end and be replaced with cheaper, safer and effective
monitoring alternatives.101 The American Immigration Council recently
made the case for ending all immigration detentions noting that during the
pandemic, the death toll in ICE facilities has been higher than during the
last fifteen years and also documenting the availability and effectiveness

94
See The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants,
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of alternatives to detention.102 The U.S. would not be alone in taking such
measures. In response to COVID-19, at least ten nations across the world
instituted alternatives to immigration detention.103
Similarly, Biden should end all deportations to nations that are not
equipped to contain the virus (and this includes the Northern Triangle)
until those safeguards are in place. Beyond COVID-19, the Biden
administration will need to reckon with whether deportation policies in
place during the Obama administration, which included hundreds of
thousands of Central Americans,104 resulted in greater harm than good to
U.S. interests. Significant research has documented the ways in which
these practices only aggravated insecurity in the region and provoked
further forced migration north.105

b. COVID Relief Laws, Policies and Practices Must Protect
All U.S. Residents Irrespective of Immigration Status
President Biden ran on a platform distinguishing himself on how his
administration would prioritize a concerted response to the pandemic. It is
no surprise that his plan to combat coronavirus is extensive and includes a
number of important measures, some of which can be implemented
immediately and some of which will require legislation.106 The plan is
largely silent on immigration status. The only explicit mention of
immigration in his plan is when it mentions reversing the public charge
rule.107 Similarly, while President Biden’s immigration plan explicitly
mentions increasing labor protections for agricultural workers, it is silent
on issues of health.108
102
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On January 14, 2021, President Biden also released the text of his $1.9
trillion COVID-19 relief bill at the same time that it announced pursuing
CIR legislation. The COVID-19 bill is extensive and contains three major
targets: $400 billion for containing spread of COVID-19 and increasing
vaccine capabilities; over $1 trillion to assist families needing direct
financial support; and $440 billion in emergency funds for cash-poor small
businesses and communities.109 Even if adopted, direct assistance to
families110 is unlikely to be available to immigrants, except those who are
lawful permanent residents under federal law’s treatment of public
benefits for immigrants.111 As a result, unless both CIR are adopted, most
provisions of the COVID-19 legislation will not directly benefit
immigrants who lack lawful permanent status. Nevertheless, it is quite
possible that the public health measures to address COVID-19 will (or
should) have more universal application. As well, emergency funds to
businesses and communities can free up states to redirect some of their
own resources to immigrant families left out of federal financial
assistance.
A guiding principle of the Biden COVID-19 Plan is to ensure that
health professionals, and not politicians, make decisions that ensure the
public health.112 It is imperative that in making these choices, health
officials are heard in terms of ensuring access to COVID-19 testing,
vaccinations, and treatment, at a minimum, which the plan guarantees
should be free and widely available to everyone,113 should also be
available to migrants, irrespective of immigration status. Immigrants,
particularly those from Mexico and Central America who lack permanent
legal status, are uniquely vulnerable to the health impacts of the
pandemic.114 Immigrants are also concentrated in occupations that are
109
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Biden’s First COVID-Relief Bill Isn’t Screwing Around, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://slate.com/business/2021/01/biden-covid-relief-bill.html.
111
See Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/immigrantshcr (last updated Jan. 2014); Update on
Access to Health Care for Immigrants and Their Families, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/update-on-access-to-health-care-for-immigrantsand-their-families (last updated May 27, 2020); see generally Cori Alonso-Yoder, Publicly
Charged: A Critical Examination of Immigrant Public Benefit Restrictions, 97 DENV. L.
REV. 1 (2019).
112
The Biden COVID Plan, supra note 106.
113
Id.
114
Meccheri, supra note 83.
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suffering massive job losses due to shelter in place mandates or, if
employed, are experiencing high exposure to COVID-19 when most lack
the health coverage they need if infected with COVID-19.115 One estimate
calculates that there are at least 6 million undocumented workers who are
in frontlines as essential workers.116 Yet, reports on the ground from health
experts suggest that they are being dangerously left out from basic access
to COVID-19 testing, vaccination, and health care in ways that threaten
not only migrants themselves but all U.S. residents.117
Federal COVID-19 economic relief, which is also urgent, so far has
left out all migrants who are not lawful permanent residents, with dire
consequences to themselves but also to the U.S. economy overall.118 In
fact, the first relief, known as the CARES Act,119 even precluded citizens
lawfully married to undocumented immigrants from collecting aid.120 In
response, a handful of states provided their own but limited sources of
economic relief to migrants, while food pantries and other groups have
supplied basic necessities.121 Most of the types of federal economic relief
President Biden identifies in his plan are likely to require legislative action
but not all (e.g., food relief). At a minimum, President Biden should ensure
right away that distribution of basic emergency staples, COVID-19
staples, and vaccinations should be made available to all who need it
irrespective of immigration status. Beyond this, future pandemic relief
115

Id. See also O’Connor et al., supra note 56.
Lissandra Villa, ‘We’re Ignored Completely.’ Amid the Pandemic, Undocumented
TIME
(Apr.
17,
2020),
Immigrants
Are
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https://time.com/5823491/undocumented-immigrants-essential-coronavirus/.
117
See id. See also Will Humble, Undocumented immigrants’ lack of access to COVID(July
8,
2020),
19
testing
threatens
all
of
us,
AZCENTRAL
https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/2020/07/08/undocumented-immigrantslack-access-coronavirus-testing-threatens-arizona/5392271002/.
118
Villa, supra note 116. See also Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda et al., Undocumented During
COVID-19: Essential for the Economy but Excluded from Relief, UCLA LATINO POL’Y &
POLS. INITIATIVES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://latino.ucla.edu/research/undocumented-duringcovid-19-essential-for-the-economy-but-excluded-from-relief/.
119
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. 116-136
(2020).
120
Rights Groups Urge Inclusion of Immigrant Families in Coronavirus Relief Bill, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/20/rights-groups-urgeinclusion-immigrant-families-coronavirus-relief-bill.
121
Roberto Suro & Hannah Findling, State and Local Aid for Immigrants during the
COVID-19 Pandemic: Innovating Inclusion, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (July 8, 2020),
https://cmsny.org/publications/state-local-aid-immigrants-covid-19-pandemicinnovating-inclusion; Brenda León, Immigrant Woman Starts Food Pantry In Her Home
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Undocumented
Families,
NPR
(Dec.
2,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/12/02/940555647/immigrant-woman-starts-food-pantry-in-her-home-tohelp-undocumented-families.
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measures, which could be included as part of a CIR bill, should consider
rectifying the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants from unemployment
relief or access to health insurance.122 Such measures would help stabilize
the U.S. economy faster and also help curb the spread of the virus.123

c. DHS should Restore and Expand TPS for Salvadorans
and Hondurans and Extend it to Guatemalans
President Biden’s immigration plan calls for a review of TPS for
vulnerable populations who cannot return safely to their countries based
on violence or disaster.124 There are compelling reasons why this review
should lead the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to immediately
restore and expand TPS for Salvadorans and extend it to Guatemalans.
Qualifying nationals from El Salvador and Honduras have been the
recipients of TPS since 2001 and 1999 respectively.125 Since 1990,
Congress authorized the immigration agencies, a power that today rests
with the U.S. DHS, to offer temporary protection to nationals of a foreign
country due to certain conditions which temporarily prevent the country’s
nationals from returning safely.126 TPS designation lasts for an initial
period of six to eighteen months, upon notice in the federal register.127
Timely extensions are possible and require review and consultation with
the appropriate agencies to ensure the conditions for such designation
continue to be met.128
Honduras, alongside Nicaragua, were originally granted TPS in 1999
based on Hurricane Mitch’s devastation to the region in 1998, which also
deeply damaged Guatemala.129 El Salvador would receive TPS a few years
122

Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, Vulnerable to COVID-19 and in Frontline Jobs,
Immigrants Are Mostly Shut Out of U.S. Relief, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/covid19-immigrants-shut-out-federal-relief.
123
See, e.g., Hinojosa-Ojeda, et al., supra note 118, at 14-16 (documenting the economic
benefits of including undocumented workers in pandemic economic relief measures).
124
Biden Immigration Plan, supra note 94.
125
See Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: El Salvador, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGR.
SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protectedstatus/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-honduras (last updated Dec. 7,
2020); Temporary Protected Status Designated Country: Honduras, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR.
SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protectedstatus/temporary-protected-status-designated-country-el-salvador (last updated Dec. 7,
2020).
126
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b).
127
Id. at § 1254a(b)(2).
128
Id. at § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
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Sergio Morales Roda, TPS: la larga historia de solicitudes fallidas que Guatemala ha
hecho a EE. UU., PRENSA LIBRE [TPS: Guatemala’s Long History of Failed Applications
to the U.S.] (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/migrantes/tps-lalarga-historia-de-solicitudes-fallidas-que-guatemala-ha-hecho-a-ee-uu.
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later in 2001 based on an earthquake that devastated the nation.130 The
designations offered protection only to certain eligible nationals from
these countries131 who apply every time the benefit is offered and who are
not disqualified based on inadmissibility grounds132 such as certain
criminal convictions.133 The largest group has been Salvadorans at nearly
250,000 recipients, followed by Honduras at 67,000 recipients.
Regrettably to many, especially Guatemalans, Guatemala’s then
President Álvaro Arzú refused to seek the benefit for its nationals when it
was available.134 Indeed, Guatemalan Presidents have attempted no fewer
than five times, as have even members of the U.S. Congress, to seek TPS
protections for Guatemalans, based on natural disasters that have justified
the extension of the benefit to the other three Central American nations.135
In contrast, until President Trump took office, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
El Salvador had been successfully maintaining uninterrupted TPS status
justified largely by the recognition of ongoing instability in the region
based on new crises but also on how much TPS holders were contributing
to stability in the region through remittances.136 Then, in 2017, DHS
130

Designation of El Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg.
14214,14215 (Mar. 9, 2001).
131
Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US
Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti, 5 J. ON
MIGRATION AND HUM. SEC. 577, 578–79 (2017) (explaining that to apply for TPS,
Salvadorans must have arrived and been living continuously in the US prior to February
13, 2001 and Hondurans prior to December 30, 1998).
132
Section 212 of the INA specifies broad grounds on which foreign nationals are
considered ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Section 244(c)(2) in the TPS
statute lists which of these grounds of inadmissibility may be waived and which may not
be waived.
133
According to the regulations, conviction of a felony or two or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States will disqualify one from TPS. Jose Magaña-Salgado et al.,
Comparison of Criminal and Inadmissibility Grounds for American Dream and Promise
Act of 2019, DACA, and TPS, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. 2, 4 (Sept. 2019),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/201909_comparison_of_criminal_and_inadmissibility_grounds_for_american_dream_and_pr
omise_act_of_2019_daca_and_tps_final.pdf.
134
See Morales Roda supra note 129.
135
See id.
136
See id. Nicaragua’s TPS status was renewed 13 times, mostly based on subsequent
droughts and other natural disasters. See Extension of Designation of Nicaragua Under
Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,440 (May 11, 2000); Extension of
the Designation of Nicaragua Under the Temporary Protected Status Program, 66 Fed. Reg.
23,271 (May 8, 2001); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua Under the Temporary
Protected Status Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,454 (May 3, 2002); Extension of the
Designation of Nicaragua Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic
Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguans, 68 Fed. Reg.
23,748 (May 5, 2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for
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Nicaragua; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for
Nicaragua TPS Beneficiaries, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,088 (Nov. 3, 2004); Extension of the
Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Nicaragua; Automatic Extension of
Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaragua TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg.
16,333 (Mar. 31, 2006); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary
Protected Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for
Nicaraguan TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,534 (May 29, 2007); Extension of the
Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,138 (Oct. 1,
2008); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status and
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguan TPS
Beneficiaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,737 (May 5, 2010); Extension of the Designation of
Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment
Authorization Documentation for Nicaraguan TPS Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,493
(Nov. 4, 2011); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status,
78 Fed. Reg. 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2013); Extension of the Designation of Nicaragua for
Temporary Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,176 (Oct. 16, 2014); Extension of the
Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,325 (May 16,
2016). El Salvador’s TPS status was renewed 11 times also based on new natural disasters.
See Extension of the Designation of El Salvador Under the Temporary Protected Status
Program; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for
Salvadorans, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,000 (July 11, 2002); Extension of the Designation of El
Salvador Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic Extension of
Employment Authorization Documentation for El Salvador, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,071 (July 16,
2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador;
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for El Salvador TPS
Beneficiaries, 70 Fed. Reg. 1450 (Jan. 7, 2005); Extension of the Designation of
Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador; Automatic Extension of Employment
Authorization Documentation for El Salvadorian TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,637
(June 15, 2006); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected
Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Salvadoran
TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,649 (Aug. 21, 2007); Extension of the Designation of
El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,128 (Oct. 1, 2008); Extension
of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension
of Employment Authorization Documentation for Salvadoran TPS Beneficiaries, 75 Fed.
Reg. 39,556 (July 9, 2010); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary
Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation
for Salvadoran TPS Beneficiaries, 77 Fed. Reg. 1710 (Jan. 11, 2012); Extension of the
Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 78 Fed. Reg. 32,418 (May 30,
2013); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 80
Fed. Reg. 893 (Jan. 7, 2015); Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary
Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,645 (July 8, 2016). Honduras’s TPS status was renewed
14 times also based on new natural disasters. See Extension of Designation of Honduras
Under Temporary Protected Status Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,438 (May 11, 2000);
Extension of the Designation of Honduras Under the Temporary Protected Status Program,
66 Fed. Reg. 23,269 (May 8, 2001); Extension of the Designation of Honduras Under the
Temporary Protected Status Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 22,451 (May 3, 2002); Extension of
the Designation of Honduras Under Temporary Protected Status Program; Automatic
Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Hondurans, 68 Fed. Reg.
23,744 (May 5, 2003); Extension of the Designation of Temporary Protected Status for
Honduras; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for
Honduras TPS Beneficiaries, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,084 (Nov. 3, 2004); Extension of the

102 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

sought to end TPS protections for Nicaraguans137 and similarly for
Hondurans138 and Salvadorans in 2018.139 In each instance, DHS focused
solely on whether or not the circumstances that warranted the original
designation were ongoing and not on the cumulative factors that led prior
administrations to renew TPS for each of these nations over several
years.140 DHS also highlighted significant improvement in the overall
economic and social and security conditions in these countries, even as it
also acknowledged the few opportunities that TPS recipients would have
if returned.141
Litigation ensued to prohibit DHS from terminating TPS for El
Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan, which is still pending but likely
not for long in ways that favor the government. On September 14, 2020, a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated an
injunction prohibiting DHS from terminating TPS for El Salvador, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and Sudan.142 However, because the appellate court has not
issued its directive to the district court to make that ruling effective, the
injunction remains in place at this time.143 For this reason, until the
Designation of Temporary Protected Status for Honduras; Automatic Extension of
Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduras TPS Beneficiaries, 71 Fed. Reg.
16,328 (Mar. 31, 2006); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary
Protected Status; Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for
Honduran TPS Beneficiaries, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,529 (May 29, 2007); Extension of the
Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,133 (Oct. 1,
2008); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS
Beneficiaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,734 (May 5, 2010); Extension of the Designation of
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status and Automatic Extension of Employment
Authorization Documentation for Honduran TPS Beneficiaries, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,488 (Nov.
4, 2011); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 78
Fed. Reg. 20,123 (Apr. 3, 2013); Extension of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary
Protected Status, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,170 (Oct. 16, 2014); Extension of the Designation of
Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,331 (May 16, 2016); Extension
of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,630 (Dec.
15, 2017).
137
Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed.
Reg. 59,636, 59,637 (Dec. 15, 2017).
138
Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed.
Reg. 26,074 (June 5, 2018).
139
Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 83
Fed. Reg. 2654 (Jan. 18, 2018).
140
See Termination of the Designation of Nicaragua for Temporary Protected Status,
supra note 138; Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected
Status, supra note 139; Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary
Protected Status, supra note 140.
141
Id.
142
Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
143
Id.
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injunction is lifted permanently, DHS has temporarily continued to extend
TPS protections to all countries whose status it sought to end, including
Honduras, even though it was not named in the original litigation.144 A
large reason for its decision is that the TPS statute also provides that
“[t]here is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with
respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of
a foreign state under this subsection.”145 Thus, DHS under a new President
and a new Secretary can undo DHS’s decision to end TPS for these
nations.
There are several reasons why Biden’s DHS Secretary, Alejandro
Mayorkas,146 can and should consider not simply reversing the prior
administration’s decisions to end TPS for Salvadorans and Hondurans but
issue expanded TPS protections to Salvadorans, Hondurans, and
Guatemalans. Legally, DHS has broad discretion to grant TPS based on
factors that are easily satisfied by these nations. The levels of generalized
violence these nations have experienced and continue to experience
surpass the violence experienced in many countries to which the label civil
war has been more easily applied.147 However, it is probably legally and
politically more viable to continue to focus on environmental disasters in
the region that are substantial but temporary in nature and that can include
floods, drought, and epidemics148 or based on extraordinary and temporary
conditions that prevent the safe return of its nationals to their country.

144

See Temporary Protected States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last updated Mar. 11,
2021).
145
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A).
146
Alejandro
Mayorkas,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/person/alejandro-mayorkas (last updated Feb. 11, 2021).
147
Amelia Cheatham, Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northerntriangle (last updated Oct. 1, 2019). Scholars have called for a rethinking of the application
of the armed conflict or civil war label narrowly given the nature of violence that plague
today’s nation states. See, e.g., Megan Meyer & Simon Stacey, Civil Society, Violence and
War, INT’L ENCYC. OF CIV. SOC’Y (Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler eds., 2009).
148
The TPS statute authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate foreign
countries for TPS “after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government” and
“only if” the Secretary finds one or more of the following criteria met: “(A) . . . that there
is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return
of aliens who are nationals of that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose
a serious threat to their personal safety; (B) . . . that— (i) there has been an earthquake,
flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a
substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected, (ii) the
foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens
who are nationals of the state, and (iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation
under this subparagraph; or (C) . . . that there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions
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Part I of this essay provides documentation that strongly supports the
renewal and extension of TPS status to all Northern Triangle nationals in
the U.S. today based on COVID-19’s cumulative and substantial impact
on the region. In addition to this, while the U.S. was mostly focused on
our Presidential elections, Category 4 Hurricane storms ETA and IOTA
devastated the region even more with the hardest hit areas including El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.149 According to the U.N.
International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), nearly 9.3 million people,
including 3.5 million children, were affected by the storms and thousands
of people remain in shelters, facing heightened risks to their health and
safety.150 Oxfam reports are even worse, estimating that so far 11 million
people have been affected throughout the region, with 800,000 evacuated
from their communities.151 The scale of the damage is drawing
comparisons, in fact, to Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which became the basis
for granting TPS protections to Hondurans and Nicaraguans originally.152
UNICEF and other donors have been trying to provide as much
humanitarian aid as quickly as possible but they admit that it is nowhere
near enough given the scale of the damage and the fact that floodwaters
are expected to last another six months.153 Damaged water systems and
other critical infrastructure will need to be rehabilitated while hundreds of
schools will have to be rebuilt.154 This, on top of the enormous pandemicrelated challenges these nations were already facing, have completely
overwhelmed the ability of these nations to recover.155
Beyond the ample legal and humanitarian grounds for renewing and
expanding TPS to the entire Northern Triangle, the new DHS Secretary
must weigh the costs of stripping TPS from the estimated 325,000 Central
American TPS holders (including Nicaraguans) who have had the status
in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the
state in safety . . . “ 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b).
149
Maryanne Murray Buechner, Long Road Ahead for Hurricane Recovery in Central
America, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/unicefusa/2021/01/07/longroad-ahead-for-hurricane-recovery-in-central-america. See also Sylva Mathema & Tom
Jawetz, TPS Can Promote Stability and Recovery for Central American Countries Hit by
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Dec.
21,
2020),
Recent
Hurricanes,
CTR.
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/12/18101139/CentralAmericaTPS
-brief.pdf.
150
UNICEF, CENTRAL AMERICA: HURRICANES ETA AND IOTA, HUMANITARIAN
SITUATION
REPORT
NO.6
(Dec.
21,
2020),
https://www.unicef.org/media/89736/file/UNICEF-Central-America-HumanitarianSituation-Report-No.-6-(-Hurricanes-Eta-and-Iota-)-10-21-December-2020.pdf.
151
Mathema & Jawetz, supra note 149.
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Buechner, supra note 149.
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Id.
155
Mathema & Jawetz, supra note 149, at 4-7.
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for at least two decades.156 This population is well-established in the U.S.
and is making significant contributions to our nation. 22% of TPS holders
from these three nations arrived in the U.S. under the age of sixteen while
an estimated 273,000 of them have U.S. born citizen children.157 Their
labor force participation, ranging from 81–88%, is well above the overall
U.S. population (63%) and the foreign born population as whole (66%).158
They work in jobs that are essential to the economic recovery of our nation
during and post-pandemic.159 Several recent studies calculate the losses
that could result from ending TPS and removing its beneficiaries to the US
economy in the billions of dollars.160
Finally, TPS holders also make significant remittances contributions
to their family members back home and contribute enormously to the
stability of the region. A study of Salvadoran TPS holders and remittances
found that between 80–85% among them still send money home, which
amounts to about $600 million annually.161 Of course, this figure could be
greater if the U.S. extends TPS to all Salvadorans, Guatemalans and
Hondurans residing in the U.S. as of November 2020, the dates of the most
recent hurricanes. These numbers could be as high as 1.8 million
persons.162 This is a population that is already likely employed and already
sending remittances home.163 However, several economic studies show
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2019),
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See id. at 6-7.
161
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NPR
(Jan.
9,
2018),
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https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (last
visited Mar. 12, 2021) (estimating that there are 750,000 unauthorized Salvadorans,
588,000 unauthorized Guatemalans, and 402,000 unauthorized Hondurans in the United
States).
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See generally id. See also Erica Williams et al., Inclusive Approach to Immigrants
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(Dec.
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2019),
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that legalization measures, even temporary ones, result in higher earnings
for the beneficiaries and more taxes (and remittances) for communities.164

d. DACA’s Extension Will Also Help Many Young
Dreamers from Northern Triangle Nations
President Biden’s immigration plan includes a strongly worded
promise to dreamers to seek protections for them and their families more
permanently while supporting their access to higher education.165
President Biden is already poised to fulfill this promise with this newly
introduced CIR.166 Until CIR is adopted, however, President Biden can do
a lot to improve the plight of DACA recipients. President Biden’s plan
also included a promise to restore DACA protections to new applicants
while facilitating renewals, which had been slowed down or halted when
President Trump moved to end the program,167 a move the US Supreme
Court blocked in June 2020.168 In response, DHS issued a memorandum
explaining that new applications for DACA would not be accepted and
that renewals would be limited to one year instead of two amid an ongoing
review.169 However, in response to a December 2020 federal district court
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order,170 DHS is already mandatorily fulfilling Biden’s promise of
allowing new DACA applicants and restoring renewals to a two year
benefit.171
Since 2012, more than 825,000 persons brought to the U.S. as children
have benefited from DACA and thousands more will do so now that new
applications are open.172 Mexico is by far the top country of origin for
active DACA recipients (around 80%), and it is followed by the three
Northern Triangle nations who combined account for more than 60,000
recipients.173 DACA’s effect as a powerful engine of social mobility is
well documented,174 as are the significant economic contributions that
DACA recipients make,175 including as frontline health workers during the
pandemic.176

e. President Biden Must End the Trump Administration’s
Illegal Treatment of Asylum Seekers at the U.S.-Mexico
Border and Redress the Health and Humanitarian Chaos
Created by these Policies and Practices
President Biden’s Immigration Plan pledges to end in his first 100
days in office both President Trump’s detrimental asylum policies and the
mismanagement of the asylum system that has created violence and chaos
at the border.177 Much has been written about the ways in which the Trump
administration transformed immigration law, including by substantially
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restricting asylum protections.178 To do so, the Trump administration
relied on executive orders, agency decisions, bilateral agreements with
other nations, and even formal rulemaking.179 Combined, the efforts
revealed a sophisticated and targeted strategy to create insurmountable
immediate barriers to deny those arriving at the U.S.–Mexico border, most
from Northern Triangle nations, the ability to successfully file for asylum.
These measures included, for example, the so-called “Remain in Mexico
program”,180 the “Safe Third Country Agreements” with Central American
nations,181 and the “metering” of asylum applications at the border.182 It
was also, however, a sophisticated longer-term strategy to end asylum
protections to most persons escaping the types of violence they
experienced in Northern Triangle nations, including domestic or gangrelated violence. This became particularly evident in the proposed June 15,
2020 asylum regulations.183
Dozens of lawsuits in federal court challenged these policies,184
including ones targeting the June 15 regulation.185 A California federal
district court, in fact, blocked the June 15 regulation three days before it
was due to come into effect.186 Nonetheless, Trump’s efforts have been
extremely effective. In addition to data that shows a drop in asylum
178
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applications from Northern Triangle applicants,187 more than 20,000
asylum applicants still await their turn to apply for asylum at various
Mexican border towns, some for as long as two years, despite horrific
conditions and perilous circumstances.188 A December 2020 Human
Rights First Report further documented that thousands of asylum seekers,
including unaccompanied minors, are being illegally expelled without the
opportunity to apply for asylum.189 President Biden recognizes that while
reversal of the Trump asylum policies must be immediate, resolving the
humanitarian crisis at the border and the chaos created to the asylum
system will take time and resources. President Biden’s plan, for example,
calls for working with a network of organizations, such as faith-based
shelters, non-governmental aid organizations, legal non-profits, and
refugee assistance agencies who will need federal resources to solve the
humanitarian crisis at the border.190 This approach makes a great deal of
sense and should remain a top priority for the Biden administration.
A significant challenge President Biden faces is how quickly and
where to relocate the thousands of asylum seekers subjected to the remain
in Mexico policy. Ideally, given length and inhumane conditions endured
by this population in Mexico, the Biden Administration will move swiftly
to adjudicate their asylum petitions safely from within the U.S. Ideally,
asylum seekers can be tested for COVID-19 and quarantined to follow
public health guidelines. Many asylum seekers have family members in
the U.S. ready and willing to host them.191 For those who do not have
sponsors, shelters or hotels could be used as temporary housing for asylum
seekers.192 These alternatives are much better than the current status quo—
crowded and largely abandoned encampments—which are sites of
COVID-19 community transmission not only in Mexico but across the
border into the U.S.193
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f. Biden Must Review Immediately the Necessity and
Effectiveness of a Ban on all Lawful Permanent
Immigration to the United States as a COVID-19 Safeguard
In October 2020, the CATO Institute issued a report documenting the
substantial decline in legal immigration to the U.S., particularly in the
second half of 2020.194 “Overall,’ the report noted, ‘the second half of FY
2020 saw 92% fewer immigrants from abroad than the first half, which
was larger than any annual decline in the history of the U.S.”195 Much of
the drop in numbers can be attributed directly to travel restrictions that
President Trump imposed on all legal immigration starting in April 2020
in response to COVID-19,196 restrictions that, based on a recent extension
by President Trump, are scheduled to remain in effect until March 2021.197
However, the decline in numbers began prior to the pandemic due to
earlier policies directed at refugees and asylum seekers.198 Another
important fact is that, unlike permanent immigration, most other travel to
the U.S., including for tourism, was reopened as of July 2020 based on
economic concerns, despite the pandemic.199 Thus, while travel by
temporary immigrants, including for tourism, dropped by more than half
from the previous year, the U.S. State Department still reports over 4
million admissions of temporary immigrants in 2020.200 In January 2020,
the only travel restrictions for most temporary visitors applied only to a
few nations, namely China, Iran, Ireland, Brazil, and those in the United
Kingdom and in the European Schengen area.201
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Travel restrictions are most certainly legitimate ways to curtail the
spread of a global pandemic.202 Indeed, most nations in the world have at
some point adopted travel restrictions in response to COVID-19.203 U.S.
travel restrictions adopted under the Trump administration as a response
to COVID-19, however, raise legitimate questions of motivation, lack of
consistency, necessity, and effectiveness.204 Moreover, travel restrictions,
when imposed, should consider whether the health gains outweigh the
profound impact on the U.S. economy, family reunification, and
humanitarian concerns, to name a few. From the Northern Triangle region,
for example, the majority of migration is based on family unification.205
Given the socio-economic impacts of banning permanent immigration, the
U.S. should also consider whether alternative safety measures, such as
requiring testing and quarantine, can work to ameliorate the impacts of
travel bans.206 Other nations are doing this with promising results.207
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B. How U.S. Reforms to U.S. Foreign Aid Can Aid Recovery in the
Northern Triangle
1. U.S. Foreign Aid to Northern Triangle Nations: From
Obama to Trump
Especially in recent decades, as Central America became a major
transit corridor of illicit drugs into the U.S. and also the biggest sender of
forced migration, U.S. policy makers sought to increase aid to the
region.208 While there is general agreement that aid should advance U.S.
interests in stopping or reducing flows of illicit drugs and unauthorized
migrations from the region, more divisions arise on how to achieve these
aims through U.S. aid. Disagreements have ranged, for example, on
whether funding should focus on tough law and order measures targeting
illicit groups or migrants versus longer-term approaches that seek to
strengthen the rule of law (i.e., anti-corruption or anti-impunity measures)
or to address poverty through trade and other economic development
policies or creating alternatives to incarceration as a way of reintegrating
illicit groups into society.209 These differences were visible especially
during the Obama and Trump administrations as described below.
In 2014, President Obama approved a new government strategy for
engagement in Central America, viewing the increased investment and the
new approach to be in the best interest of the U.S.210 U.S. efforts over the
past 20 years had generally emphasized a single objective, such as
economic growth or crime reduction. In contrast, President Obama
grounded his strategy on the premise that prosperity, security, and
governance are “mutually reinforcing and of equal importance.”211
With congressional support, the Obama administration launched the
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which took a more
comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in Central
America, based on the premise that efforts to promote prosperity, improve
security, and strengthen governance are mutually reinforcing and of equal
importance. The new strategy, which was also deeply influenced by
Congress, did not completely abandon security strategies aimed at
disrupting networks of drug flows. These did, however, expand to include
208
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strengthening the capacity of domestic justice sector institutions to
prosecute organized crime while also supporting community-based and
violence prevention efforts in the region.212 The Obama administration’s
new strategy sought “the evolution of an economically integrated Central
America that is fully democratic; [the provision of] economic
opportunities to its people . . . more accountable, transparent, and effective
institutions; and ensur[ing] a safe environment for its citizens.”
Under President Obama, and with congressional support, aid to the
region doubled.213 Since 2016, Congress appropriated more than $3.6
billion toward Obama’s new strategy, allocating the money relatively
evenly between programs focused on good governance, economic growth,
and social welfare and Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI) programs intended to prevent violence, reform justice-sector
institutions, and combat gangs and organized crime.214 In addition,
Congress imposed strict conditions on the aid to address a number of
concerns, including border security, human rights, and corruption.215 U.S.
agencies allocated the vast majority of the aid to the Northern Triangle
countries.216
Initially, President Trump maintained President Obama’s foreign aid
strategy in the region. This all changed in March 2019, less than two years
into the strategy’s on-the-ground implementation due to President
Trump’s frustration over the continued flow of forced migration from the
region to the U.S.217 Over the course of 2019, the Trump administration
repurposed $396 million of aid away from the Northern Triangle and
toward other foreign priorities, while at the same time negotiating the socalled safe third party country agreements with these nations.218 The
Trump administration also sought to scale back U.S. assistance to Central
America. Congress rejected some of the Administration’s proposed
reductions, but annual appropriations for the region declined by nearly
30% since FY 2016.219 The Trump administration’s decision to cut off aid
to the region undermined significant progress in the implementation of
programs designed to alleviate poverty.220
212
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Then, in October 2019, after Northern Triangle nations signed the
migration agreements, the Trump administration announced it would
restore aid to the region.221 In June 2020, the Trump administration
communicated its intent to Congress to release more than $705 million of
new and previously suspended assistance, planning to focus on advancing
U.S. national security interests, the implementation of the migration
agreements, and addressing COVID-19 and other humanitarian needs in
the region.222 Trump’s 2021 budget request also included a request of
nearly $337 million for all of Central America, conditioned for Northern
Triangle nations based on compliance with their migration agreements.223
In December 2020, as part of the second COVID-19 stimulus package
adopted by Congress during the Trump administration, Congress imposed
new restrictions on military aid aimed to target corruption and concerns
over authoritarianism in El Salvador.224

2. Assessing Effectiveness
There isn’t consensus on how the effectiveness of foreign aid in the
region should be measured, even by the U.S. government. To the Trump
administration, the only metric that mattered for assessing success was the
reduction in flows of forced migrants from the Central American region to
the U.S.225 In contrast, other administrations or congressional entities have
considered longer-term metrics that include efforts to end impunity (e.g.,
the number of prosecutions); anti-corruption efforts; drops in violence;
and sustained economic growth.226 In this regard, although some early
signs pointed to good progress flowing from the Obama administration’s
strategy for engaging in Central America,227 data is insufficient given the
strategy’s abrupt interruption by the Trump administration; its longer-term
projections for measuring change; and, now, of course, the effects of the
pandemic and hurricanes to any gains that may have been achieved in the
region.228
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Despite good measures of success, U.S. congressional studies began
to document the ways in which the Obama Administration’s new strategy
had started to build an infrastructure that could, with sustained efforts and
investments, bring more lasting change to the region. Some of these
changes, for example, included efforts to improve trade in the region by,
inter alia, strengthening the capacity of regional and local trade
organizations to promote better trade policies and practices; improve
customs and border management; diversify and reduce electricity
production and costs; and promote new sources of green energy.229 Efforts
also focused on reducing food insecurity and chronic malnutrition while
supporting subsistence farmers diversify their crops and improve
household income.230 They also included building the region’s resilience
to withstand shocks produced from climate change (e.g., droughts or
floods) and improvement in the quality and access to education for these
most vulnerable communities that had been historically left out.231
In the area of governance, efforts in the region had started to focus on
issues of fiscal accountability and transparency in the collection and
distribution of public resources; supporting the judiciary’s efforts to rootout corruption; depoliticizing and professionalizing the hiring of public
officials; strengthening the quality and flow of public information by
protecting the press and human rights defenders.232 In the area of security,
the focus remained on supporting the military in their fight against
organized crime but programs also expanded to strengthen policing and
implementing crime and violence prevention measures by, inter alia,
providing programs to youth to redirect them and support their decision
and ability to turn away from crime.233 At least in terms of priorities, these
efforts mirrored more closely some of the recommendations we made in
our white paper about the types of changes and reforms desperately needed
in the region to have a longer-term impact in improving the lives of Central
Americans.234

3. What is/Should be the Future of Foreign Aid in the Region
President Biden, who as Vice President and Senator, played a
significant role in advancing the Obama administration’s priorities in
Central America, is well-positioned to improve on President Obama’s
vision to help the region address the root-causes of forced migration in the
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 11.
See generally Aldana et al., supra note 3, at 11-17.

116 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:2

region in ways that also elevate their prospects to live happy and dignified
lives home.235 It was President Biden, in fact, who helped secure consensus
in Congress to secure President Obama’s multi-year strategy to reduce
forced migration from the region.236 Moreover, Biden’s involvement in the
region, characterized as tough but also fair and guided by a moral compass
that the U.S. owes the region, lends him credibility to restore much of the
distrust against the U.S. and the political polarization that has intensified
in the region under the Trump administration.237 In fact, uncommonly so,
President Biden not only included addressing the root causes of forced
migration from the Northern Triangle as part of his plan on immigration,238
but also adopted an independent plan for the region as part of his
campaign.239
The first notable characteristic of President Biden’s Central American
plan is its tone which treats these nations as partners and friends, not only
based on regional proximity but on shared history and values.240 The plan
is grounded in five pillars: (1) a $4 billion, four–year regional strategy; (2)
mobilizing private investment; (3) a focus on security and improving the
rule of law; (4) addressing endemic corruption; and (5) prioritizing poverty
reduction and economic development.241 Much of what is in President
Biden’s plan is consistent with recommendations by experts who have
studied the impact of good and bad U.S. foreign aid investments in the
region.242 The plan makes clear that a condition of investment will be on
those nation’s own verifiable investments and commitments to broader
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reforms to meet goals 3-5.243 Another welcomed aspect of the plan is a
commitment to target investments primarily in civil society organizations
that are on the frontlines of addressing root causes of forced migration,
while recognizing the central role of women as powerful forces for
development.244 This will be especially important in countries like
Honduras and El Salvador, which, due to upcoming elections, if monies
are funneled through central governments, could divert these resources for
political gain.245 It is also a welcome policy change to return to an anticorruption agenda, which had made significant progress, at least in
Guatemala, until those efforts were stalled or even reversed during the
Trump administration.246 Additionally, it is gratifying to see a
commitment, based on evidenced-based practices worldwide,247 to engage
in anti-violence efforts by supporting youth with alternative programs that
can help them escape a dangerous life in criminal gangs and victims of
domestic violence, not only with prosecutions, but with support to escape
their abusers.248
Finally, the plan makes a commitment to poverty alleviation, such as
through programs that address food insecurity and chronic malnutrition,
especially alongside the dry corridor, but also through sustained economic
development that prioritizes human development and addresses climate
change. The plan also makes assertions to incentivize economic
development through foreign investment, including by ensuring more
favorable laws (i.e., labor laws) for investors. President Biden’s optimism
should be more cautious here and be more informed by the role of private
foreign investment in the region. Liberalizing policies that have promoted
deregulation of natural resources and environmental protections, while
leaving workers largely unprotected, despite strong labor laws, have not
been good for poverty alleviation or economic development in the
region.249 This is not to say that foreign investment cannot be good for the
243
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region but as the plan reads currently only the voices of private industries
are heard. Left out are the workers and vulnerable communities who have
endured labor exploitation, extraction of their resources, a lack of antitrust
protections, land displacements, and other affronts to their personal
security based on bad investment practices with the acquiescence of local
governments and the international community.250
III. CONCLUSION

The bleak COVID-19 and post-hurricane outlook for Northern
Triangle nations requires an urgent and coordinated response to the most
pressing human needs—such as hunger, housing, and health access. It also
presents a meaningful opportunity to adopt policies and practices that can
simultaneously bring longer-term gains to the region, including in terms
of security. As an example, experts examining the adaptation of violence
to pandemic in the region note that the provision of emergency funds into
the most affected communities to help them survive the crisis will also
strengthen their resolve and ability to turn away from the pressures of
organized crime and also, potentially, from fleeing north.251 At the same
time, other experts urge the U.S. to view the region anew as a unique
opportunity to advance toward greater regional economic integration by
capturing the region’s potential, based on a young labor force and the
presence of Asian investors in the region, to play a prominent role in
production in a reconfigured global supply chains.252 This essay provided
a few immediate actions the U.S. can take to help stabilize the region not
only for its own sake but for our own.
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